UIC Law Review
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 8

Fall 1972

Mitchum v. Foster: The Civil Rights Act Is a Statutory Exception to
the Anti-Injunction Statute, 6 J. Marshall J. of Prac. & Proc. 179
(1972)
Steven B. Salk

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Steven B. Salk, Mitchum v. Foster: The Civil Rights Act Is a Statutory Exception to the Anti-Injunction
Statute, 6 J. Marshall J. of Prac. & Proc. 179 (1972)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol6/iss1/8
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
MITCHUM v. FOSTER: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
IS A STATUTORY EXCEPTION TO THE
ANTI-INJUNCTION

STATUTE

The Anti-Injunction Statute1 operates as a bar to federal
interference in state court proceedings to the extent that such
interference ccnstitutes a stay of proceedings. The statute,
however, provides for the following three exceptions:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress, or where necessary in2 aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments.

To appreciate the extent of the prohibition, a distinction must

be drawn between threatened and pending proceedings, 3 inas-

much as an injunction that does not stay proceedings in a
state court need not be justified by reference to the statutory
exceptions. 4 An injunction against the initiation of proceedings does not directly impinge on the state judiciary, since the

state judge is not yet personally involved in the case. Accordingly, the propriety of such injunctions is determined by reference to equitable discretion and federal-state comity, rather
than to the statutory command.
The background and purpose of the initial Anti-Injunction
Statute remains obscure, causing speculation concerning its
faithful application.5 However, regardless of the obscurity of
128 U.S.C. §2283 (1948).
2See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), for
a comprehensive discussion of the few recognized exceptions to the original
statute. In that case, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, erased
all the judicially created exceptions to the original act prompting Congress
to draft its modern counterpart. See generally, Durfee and Sloss, Federal
Injunction Against Proceedings in State Courts: The Life History of a
Statute, 30 MIcH. L. REv. 1145 (1932).
3 Fundamental to the question of when and under what circumstances
a federal court may enjoin normal state judicial processes in protection of
civil rights is the determination of at what point federal intervention will
be classified as a stay of a pending proceeding. The term "proceeding" is
comprehensive. It includes all steps in the state court from the convening
of the grand jury and the obtaining of indictments to the disposition of the
case on appeal. Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935); but see, Simon v.
Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115, 124-25 (1915).
4 Federal injunctions against state officials restraining them from instituting criminal actions fall short of a stay of proceedings, Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). This case is noted for drawing the distinction
between the power to enjoin a state officer from pursuing a threatened
prosecution and the power to enjoin a state court from exercising its jurisdiction already invoked.
5 As originally enacted in 1793 it provided: "[Nlor shall a writ of
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its origin, the statute plays an important role in the continual
conflict between the concepts of states' rights and federalism.6
Moreover, the recognition that the federal government will
function best if the states, as separate and distinct govern-

ments, are free to perform their individual functions without
interference, is inherent in our dual system of government.'
Both the concepts of federalism, specifically, federal respect
for state institutions, and denial of injunctive relief on grounds

distinct from the statutory prohibition8 have succumbed to the
judicial exception that federal courts may enjoin state officials

from instituting criminal actions when absolutely necessary to
protect constitutional rights. Circumstances necessitating such
an exception require that the danger of irreparable loss be both
great and immediate;10 or, in other words, a showing of a bad
faith prosecution. 1
Typically, the federal courts' equitable jurisdiction is invoked via the Civil Rights Act.1 2 Section 1983 provides both
injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state." Act of
March 2, 1793, ch. 22, §5, 1 Stat. 334. A comparison of the present day
statute, 28 U.S.C. §2283 (1948), and its 1793 predecessor pinpoints the infrequency with which the legislature has sought to engraft exceptions to the
original congressional ban. In addition, it would mistakenly indicate that its
original purpose and function is fully known and understood as well as
faithfully applied. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. (1791-93). The lack of any
congressional record has lead to speculation as to the true purpose of its
enactment. On the other hand, the purpose of the 1948 version of the
statute is recognized as to restore the basic law as generally understood and
interpreted prior to the Toucey decision. See the revisory committee note,
reprinted following text of 28 U.S.C. §2283 (1964). It has been suggested
that the original statute reflects a rising fear of federal intrusion on state
sovereignty, Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARv. L. REV.
345, 347-48 (1930).
For additional theories see Taylor and Willis, The
Power of Federal Courts To Enjoin Proceedingsin State Courts, 42 YALE L.J.
1169, 1171 (1933).
6 Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309 U.S. 4,
8-9 (1940).
The decision emphasized that the statute prevents needless
friction between federal and state courts.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). "This, perhaps, for lack of a
better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as 'Our
Federalism.'
8 See Orton v. Smith, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 263 (1865) ; Diggs v. Wolcott,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 178 (1807).
)Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ; Speilman Motor Sales Co., v.
Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 312 U.S. 45
(1941); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Williams v. Miller, 317 U.S.
599 (1942) ; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
10 Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926).
11Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) ; see also Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), containing an excellent discussion of the
abstention doctrine underscoring the necessity for reconsideration of principles under which federal courts have traditionally declined to interfere with
state judicial proceedings.
1242 U.S.C. §1983 (1964) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subiected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
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legal and equitable remedies for abuses by state officials in
matters of personal rights protected by the United States
Constitution or federal laws.13 The necessary allegations for
this type of action must show both a constitutional right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, and a deprivation or
abridgment of that right under color of a state statute or ordi14
nance.
SIGNIFICANCE OF MITCHUM v. FOSTER
The Supreme Court, in Mitchum v. Foster,1 held that
section 1983 is an Act of Congress which falls within the expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute. 16
Although this interpretation of section 1983 had repeatedly
divided the federal courts in the past,17 the Supreme Court had
declined to make a determination on this question prior to
Mitchum. 8 The primary significance of Mitchum is that it has
abolished the formalistic distinction between a threatened bad
faith state prosecution and one which has technically begun.
In either case the very concept of federalism has been eroded. To
enjoin pending as well as threatened proceedings, rather than
to permit state courts to be used as instrumentalities for the suppression of unpopular ideas, will serve to minimize existing
federal-state friction, not generate it.19 Of additional consequence is the clarification of the specific criteria to be applied
in determining whether an Act of Congress comes within the
expressly authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute. 2
The defendant, Foster, prosecutor for Bay County, Florida,
brought a suit to restrain the operation of Mitchum's business,
"The Book Mart," on the ground that it constituted a nuisance. 21 Fitzpatrick, also a defendant, and a judge of the
state circuit court, held that certain books being offered for
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
13 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) ; Mc Neese v. Board of Education,
373 U.S. 668 (1963) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) ; Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
4 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
'F 92 S.Ct. 2151 (1972). The opinion of the Supreme Court hereafter
referred to in the text as Mitchumn.
16 Id. at 2162.
17 Compare Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1.950) and
Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970), (holding §1983 is an expressly authorized exception), with Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d
579, (4th Cir. 1964) and Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963),
(§1983 is not an expressly authorized exception.)
is See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484, n.2 (1965); Cameron
v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 613, n.3 (1968); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
54 (1971).
19 Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333, 343 (6th Cir. 1970).
20 Mitchum v. Foster, 92 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (1972).
21 F.S.A. §§823.05, 60.05 (1965).
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sale by Mitchum were obscene and granted interlocutory relief

by enjoining the operation of the bookstore.2 2 While appellate
review of the preliminary order was pending, Mitchum filed a
complaint based upon 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida,23 seeking
injunctive relief against the state court proceedings on the
theory that the unconstitutional application of the Florida laws
2
caused him great and irreparable harm. 4

A single district court judge entered a temporary restraining order directed to the defendants, Foster, Fitzpatrick, and
the executive officer of the state court, staying the state pro25
Thereafter, a three-judge district court panel
ceedings.

granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and
dissolved the temporary restraining order, 26 noting:
The injunctive relief sought here as to the proceedings pending
in the Florida Courts does not come under any of the exceptions
set forth in Section 2283. It is not expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, it is not necessary in aid of this court's jurisdiction,
and it is not sought
in order to protect or effectuate any judg27
ment of the court.
The court reasoned that the dissolution of the temporary restraining order was required by the decision of the Supreme
Court in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers.21 A direct appeal from that decision was

taken to the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C.
§1253, and probable jurisdiction was noted by the Court.

The Atlantic decision, relied on by the district court, served
to delineate the constructional issue presented in Mitchum. 29
Moreover, the Atlantic decision stands for the proposition that
22 The books being sold were found to be obscene under F.S.A. §847.011
(1965).
23Federal jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. 1343(3) (1957). The
statute in relevant part provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of
Congress providing for equal rights of Citizens or all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States.
24 Plaintiff Mitchum, alleged the actions of the state prosecutor and
judicial officials were depriving him of state rights protected by the first
and fourteenth amendments.
2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2281 (1948) and 28 U.S.C. §2284 (1948).
26 Mitchum v. Foster, 315 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
27 Id. at 1389.
28 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
Hereafter noted in text as Atlantic.
29 In the A tlantw case, the railroad sought and was denied, in a Federal
District Court in Florida, an injunction against the unions picketing a
switchyard. However, such an injunction was obtained in the Florida courts.
After the union failed in dissolving the injunction in the Florida courts, it
sought an injunction against its enforcement in the Federal District Court.
The case brought to issue the two other exceptions, "where necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment."
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the Anti-Injunction Statute does not express a rule of comity
dependent upon circumstances.Y°
With unquestionable language, the Court stated:
[S]ince the statutory prohibition against such injunctions in part
rests on the fundamental constitutional independence of the states
and their courts, the exceptions should not be enlarged by loose
statutory construction. Proceedings in state courts should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the
lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the
state appellate courts and ultimately this court.1
Restated, Atlantic sanctions the rule that, with indifference to
the consequences, the Anti-Injunction Statute is an absolute
bar to federal injunctions staying state proceedings, unless the
basis of the injunction fits within one of the three statutory
exceptions.
Prior to Mitchum, the Supreme Court had ruled on the
question of federal intervention in state criminal prosecutions.
32
In Younger v. Harris
and its companion cases,33 the Court
declined to decide whether an injunction to stay proceedings in
4
a state court is "expressly authorized" by 42 U.S.C. §1983.
However, its abstention on grounds of federalism implied the
existence of such a power in limited circumstances.3 5 As interpreted by Mitchum, the basis of this implication is that if
section 1983 is not a statutory exception, then the Anti-Injunction Statute would have been an automatic bar to the injunction, rendering it perfunctory to exclude relief on grounds of
3 6
federalism.
The effect of the Atlantic and Younger decisions was to
straddle the Mitchum Court between two alternatives: overrule
Younger, at least to the extent it impliedly authorized federal
interference with state proceedings; or, proceed to construe the
Civil Rights Act as an Act of Congress "expressly authorizing"
federal courts of equity to stay proceedings in state courts.
In its entirety, the finding of an implication in Younger
authorizing federal injunctions to stay state proceedings could
be criticized as nothing more than a reverbalization of the
judicial policy recognized by the federal courts since Ex parte
30 The respondents in Atlantic argued that the act established only a
principle of comity not binding on the power of federal courts. 398 U.S.
281, 286 (1970).

sl Id. at 287.
32 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

Hereafter referred to as Younger.
33 Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S.
77 (1971) ; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971) ; Byrne v. Karalexis, 401

U.S. 216 (1971).
34401 U.S. 37 (1971),
see concurring opinion of Justices Stewart and
Harlan, at 54.

I' Id. at 55.
3692 S. Ct. 2151 at 2156 (1972).
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The nature of the circumstances asserted as justifying a stay of proceedings is substantially the same as those
the Supreme Court has recognized in actions to enjoin the "institution" of proceedings which threaten to violate constitutional rights ;38 namely, "cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope
of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown.'3
A discriminating inquiry and analysis into the reasoning
of the Mitchurn Court reveals both weakness and discrepancy.
The Court quoted Younger as authorizing an injunction to stay
state court proceedings "where irreparable injury is both great
and immediate."
However, the Younger Court was quoting
Fenner v. Boykin1 0 which defined the circumstances upon which
the doctrine of Ex parte Young41 was applicable. The Mitchum
Court also quoted Younger as authorizing an injunction "where
state law is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions." In this language, the Younger Court
was both construing the scope of Dombrowski v. Pfister,4 - involving injunctions against threatened proceedings, and quoting directly from Watson v. Buck, 4 3 another decision patterned
after Ex parte Young.44 While the Younger Court apparently
authorized such injunctions in limited circulmstances, this
authorization was made subject to the limitations of the AntiInjunction Statute.45 It must be considered that such reasoning encompasses a fundamental change of policy. The implication that federal power to stay state proceedings exists
from the denial of intervention itself, when based on grounds
distinct from the Congressional ban, represents a major change
from the prior tenet that such denial was an additional factor
calling for prohibition against federal-state injunctions.4 6
The Mitehum Court signified that the following criteria
are to be applied in determining whether an Act of Congress
comes within the expressly authorized exception to the Anti37 209 U.S. 1.23 (1908) ; see note 4 supra.

See notes 10 and 11, and text supra.
39 Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 at 85 (1971); see also Dyson v. Stein,
38

401 U.S. 200, 203 (1971).
40 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926).
41 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
42 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
43 313 U.S. 387 (1941).
44 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
45 401 U.S. 37, n.3 (1971).
46 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 165(1943), (federal interference denied solely on the basis of equity and comity). See Baines v. City
of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), noting that injunctive relief is
often denied on principles of equity and comity, the same principles which

underlie the Anti-Injunction Statute.

.litchuim
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(1)

v. Foster

the Act need not make an express

reference to the Anti-Injunction Statute; (2) the federal law
need not expressly authorize an injunction of a state court
proceeding;

and

(3)

the Act must have created a federal

right, which would be frustrated if the federal courts were
not empowered to enjoin state proceedings.
The first criterion was established in Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richmond Brothers Co.,48 where it was noted
that "no prescribed formula is required; an authorization need
not expressly refer to section 2283." In fact, none of the pre-

1948 exceptions contained an explicit reference to the AntiInjunction Statute.49
The second criterion solves problems of earlier conflicting

decisions.

Some statutes, like the Interpleader Act, 50 explicitly

authorize injunctions of state proceedings, while others, such
as the act limiting shipowners' liability, provide only that no
other proceedings may be instituted or maintained once federal
proceedings begin.51 The opinions upholding injunctions under

these statutes waver between the narrow ground that the injunctive power can be inferred from the statutory language
and the broader ground that a state court may be enjoined
52
from invading any area of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
47 92 S. Ct. 2151, 2159 (1972).
4S

348 U.S. 511, 516 (1955).

49 One, removAl act providing for removal of litigation from state to

federal courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1441-50 (1948). This Anti-Injunction Statute has
always been deemed inapplicable to removal proceedings. See Madisonville
Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Min. Co., 196 U.S. 239 (1905) ; French v. Hay,
89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 250 (1874) ; Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S.
226 (1922). The removal acts have provided for the filing in the state court
of a petition for removal and a bond. It is then the duty of the state court
to accept a proper petition and bond and proceed no further.
Two, an Act of Congress limiting the liability of shipowners, Act of
1851, 9 Stat. 635. The Act as amended provides that once a shipowner has
deposited with the court an amount equal to the value of his interest in the
ship, "All claims and proceedings against the owner with respect to the
matter in question shall cease." 46 U.S.C. §185 (1958).
See Providence
& N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 599 (1883) ; and Admiralty
Rule 51, 254 U.S. 26 (1920).
Three, legislation providing for federal interpleader actions, the Interpleader Act of 1926, 46 Stat. 416, as amended 28 U.S.C. §2361 (1958). See
Dugas v. American Surety Co., 300 U.S. 414, 428 (1937) ; Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
Four, legislation conferring federal jurisdiction over farm mortgages,
the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act, 47 Stat. 1473, as amended 11 U.S.C.
§203 (1938). See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
Five, legislation governing federal habeas corpus proceedings, 28 U.S.C.
§2251 (1948). See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1886).
Six, legislation providing for control of prices, Section 205(a) of the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 33. See Porter v. Dickens,
328 U.S. 252 (1946) and Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
Section 205(a) expired in 1947, Act of July 25, 1946, 60 Stat. 664.
5046 Stat. 416, as amended 28 U.S.C. §2361 (1958).
51 9 Stat. 635, as amended 46 U.S.C. §185 (1958).
52 See, e.g., Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503. 510-11 (1944), dealing
with the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. French v. Hay, 89 U.S.
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The third criterion, quite significantly, bases the exception
upon the necessary frustration of an equitably enforceable federal right due to a federal injunctive prohibition."
The substantive right or remedy created by the Civil Rights Act is in
the nature of a general jurisdictional grant which may or may
not call for equitable relief. 54 The creation of such a grant
is not adverse to statutory or judicial limitations upon its exercise '5 In fact, the Civil Rights Act presents a sharp contrast to statutory exceptions, such as the Removal Acts.5 6 Effective removal of a cause of action from a state court to a
federal court is incompatible with a literal application of the
Anti-Injunction Statute. 57 Moreover, there is no incompatibility between legislation which generally defines the equity
jurisdiction of federal courts and legislation which specifically
limits a judge's discretion to exercise such jurisdiction. 8 However, it is not necessary for an Act of Congress to be wholly
inconsonant with the ban of the Anti-Injunction Statute for
its remedy to be frustrated.55
The test as enounced in
Mitchum is "whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating
a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of
equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay of
,,60
state court proceeding ....
With the federal courts' function in mind, it is evident
that the remedy provided by section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act would be ineffectual if the Act were construed as not authorizing a federal court to stay state proceedings. In pointed
contrast to the Anti-Injunction Statute, the scope of section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act is clearly defined. That Act is
a product of the Reconstruction era, reflecting a movement
away from the concept of state's rights so prevalent during our
nation's beginning, when the Anti-Injunction Statute was first
enacted. 1 The Civil Rights Act was designed to alter, to a
(22 Wall.) 250, 253 (1874), dealing with the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts under the removal act.
53 Mitchum v. Foster, 92 S. Ct. 2151, 2159 (1972)

[A]n Act of Congress must have created a specific and uniquely federal

right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of equity, which could be

frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state
court proceeding.
Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963).
55 Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 589 (4th Cir. 1966).
56 Id. at 589.
57 Id.
58 Id.
54

59 Mitchum v. Foster, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2159 (1972). See also Porter v.
Dickens, 328 U.S. 252 (1946), dealing with legislation controlling prices, no
conflict between the Emergency Price Control Act and the Anti-Injunction
Statute was necessary.
8092 S.Ct. 2151, 2160 (1972).
61 Section 1983 was originally section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
The act was passed by a reconstruction Congress. 17 Stat. 13.
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limited extent, the balance of power between state and federal
courts.6 2 This alteration was necessary to guarantee the availability of fourteenth amendment freedoms to litigants in both
state and federal proceedings.,*- The state courts must share
equally in the responsibilty of guarding and enforcing rights
protected by the United States Constitution.6 4 To the extent
that state courts are unable to divest themselves of local prejudice and pressure in performing this function, federal courts
bear the burden of providing the external force to the state
6
courts. a
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Mitchum adds impetus
to the ability of federal courts to guarantee constitutional
rights. It allows the interposition of federal power, not only
at the threshold stage of state criminal proceedings, but at any
step warranted by the circumstances.
While holding that section 1983 is within the "expressly
authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Statute, the Court
clearly indicated that it did not alter the principles of
comity, equity, or state's rights which act as restraints on federal intervention. Those who seek federal intervention bear a
heavy burden in having to establish that the state, in prosecuting, deliberately acted to harass or suppress first amendment
rights. Ordinarily, the presumption that the state was in use
of its police power for legitimate ends may be sufficient to prevent federal intervention. 6 No person is immune from a good
7
faith prosecution under a valid statute.1
It presently seems that the lengthy list of Supreme Court
decisions requiring extraordinary circumstances and the dan62 For legislative history concerning the Civil Rights Act of 1871, see
the CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong. 1st Sess., App. 69 (1871), and generally
Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L.
REv. 1323 (1952).
63 The Civil Rights Act is construed as enacted for the express purpose
of enforcing the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961) ; Mc Neese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963);
Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
6
4Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
65 Id. at 248.
66 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers. 398
U.S. 281, 297 (1970) :
Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state

court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state
courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the contro-

versy.

The explicit wording of §2283 itself implies as much, and the

fundamental principle of a dual system of courts leads inevitably to
that conclusion.
67 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943) ; Cameron v.
Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
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ger of irreparable harm, both great and immediate, 68 is not
likely to be qualified in the near future. In the ordinary case,
the state courts remain the final arbiter of their own law.
However, the realization that federal injunctions staying bad
faith state prosecutions do not needlessly generate friction between the federal and state governments, but serve to minimize it, is a beneficial departure from prior law.
Steven B. Salk

6 E.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Spielman Motor Sales
Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935) ; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319
U.S. 157 (1943) ; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) ; Mitchum v.
Foster, 92 S. Ct. 2151 (1972).

